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Abstract 
 
This essay is intended to analyze the debate on the withdrawal from the ICC by 
African states. First, it examines the background of the debate. Second, it carefully looks 
at the contents of the Withdrawal Strategy Document by the AU. In so doing, this essay 
illustrates the nature of the issue as the dilemmas between politics and law, peace and 
justice, and regionalism and universalism. There is a general growing trend of multi-
layered security structures of international society in relation to the principles of local 
ownership, empowerment and partnership. The essay argues that there is room for the 
ICC’s endeavors to advance “positive complementarity.” 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The International Criminal Court 
(ICC) has been suffering from threats of 
withdrawal by African States Parties from 
the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. Some African states 
including those which traditionally 
supported the ICC have begun to speak 
critically of the ICC. The criticisms 
culminated in 2016 when Burundi, South 
Africa and Gambia expressed their 
intentions to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute. Since then, Burundi has officially 
withdrawn. Gambia has taken back its 
intention to withdraw as a result of the 
ousting of Former President Yahya 
Jammeh in 2017. The government party of 
South Africa, ANC, is still pursuing the 
completion of the domestic procedure for its 
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withdrawal request to the ICC, even after 
its Supreme Court decided that the consent 
of the Parliament is required for 
withdrawal. The impact of the resignation 
of President Jacob Zuma in February 2018 
remains to be seen. 
Their criticisms are about not only 
the ICC’s handling of some specific cases, 
but also its overall attitudes towards Africa. 
This means that their criticisms are 
addressed toward not only legal procedures, 
but also political standpoints of the ICC. 
The African Union, where States Parties 
and non-States Parties of the ICC gather, 
has adopted some decisions to discourage 
its member states to comply with the arrest 
warrants of heads of state of African states 
issued by the ICC.1 
It is too early to find whether the 
discussion about the withdrawal will 
continue. The movement for withdrawal is 
certainly an expression of frustration with 
the ICC among African states, but not yet 
a substantive move toward mass 
withdrawal. There are a significant 
number of pro-ICC states in AU influencing 
the course of the debate. It is rather 
important to recognize structural issues 
behind the scenes of the debate. If the ICC 
where many European lawyers are working 
takes harsh attitudes toward Africa 
constantly, it is natural that many would 
revitalize the memory of European 
colonialism in Africa. Whether the ICC is 
                                                  
1 The African Union, Assembly of the Union, 
“Decision on the International Criminal 
biased or not, then African leaders tend to 
expect the ICC to change or reform.  
This essay aims to explore the causes 
and nature of such frustration among 
African states with the ICC. In so doing, 
the essay seeks to identify the way to go 
forward for the ICC. The essay does not 
want the ICC, legal institution, to be 
politicized. It does not blame African 
leaders for narrow-mindedness. Rather, 
the essay tries to identify the manner the 
ICC can constructively improve its 
relationship with African states and even 
more clearly present itself as a universal 
international criminal court. 
This essay will later illustrate the 
contents of the “Withdrawal Strategy 
Document” adopted by the AU, which 
succinctly shows the attitudes and requests 
of AU to the ICC. This essay understands 
the Document as the basis of its 
examination of the issue. 
This essay takes into consideration 
the nature of contemporary international 
society in examining the issue of the 
withdrawal strategy. It is true that Africa 
is one of the significant areas where the 
application of international humanitarian 
law through channels represented by the 
ICC is being tested. But universalized 
international society after decolonization 
in which sovereign nation-states have 
become a norm is still an unfinished 
attempt in the sense that many newly 
Court”, Doc. EX.CL/952(XXVIII), 
Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI). 
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independent states remain fragile. The 
universalization of international 
humanitarian law should proceed to 
resonate with the development of the 
structure of universalized international 
society. If the development of such 
universalization loses ground, structural 
tensions arise as in the case of the 
criticisms by African states to the ICC.2 
It should be noted that the ICC is 
inevitably operating in the environment of 
the War on Terror in 21st century 
international politics as an international 
institution to respond to atrocities during 
armed conflicts. Responses to international 
crimes during armed conflicts are 
understood in the context of international 
politics. From the perspectives of those 
states which are interested in fighting 
terrorists, the ICC’s utility is its 
contributions to the War on Terror. If the 
ICC mismanage such expectation, it could 
be downgraded as an aimless institution of 
simplistic legalism. 
It should also be noted that the 
withdrawal issue is related to a growing 
need for “partnership peacekeeping” in our 
age. Contemporary international peace 
operations tend to from partnership styles 
between the United Nations and regional 
or sub-regional organizations especially in 
Africa. UN peacekeeping operations 
deployed in Africa have institutional 
                                                  
2 Hideaki Shinoda, “Peace-building and State-
building from the Perspective of the Historical 
Development of International Society”, 
linkages with AU, the Economic 
Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), and other sub-regional 
organizations in addition to extra-African 
regional organizations like the European 
Union (EU).  African states gathering at 
the AU are demanding that the ICC 
recognize the trend of the time in 
universalizing international humanitarian 
law. 
The essay examines the relationship 
between the ICC and Africa by focusing on 
the withdrawal issue by taking into 
consideration these points in international 
politics. First, it shows the chronological 
development of the withdrawal issue by 
African states. Second, it seeks to identify 
what African states expects from the ICC 
by illuminating the contents of the AU’s 
Withdrawal Strategy Document. In so 
doing, it argues that the ICC can respond 
to the concerns of African states without 
jeopardizing its integrity as an 
international legal institution. 
 
 
1．  Why do African states criticize the ICC? 
 
The first task for this essay is to 
consider the reasons why not a few political 
leaders are now so critical of the ICC. In 
order to answer the question, it is 
necessary to look at the practices of the 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 
18, issue 1. 
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ICC since its establishment in 2003. 
Almost two thirds of the African states 
have joined in the Rome Statute, as they 
supported the ICC. In 15 years, some states 
changed their attitudes towards the ICC. 
As of January 2017, the ICC is 
investigating 11 cases. 10 out of the 11 
cases are in African states; the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Central 
African Republic I and II, Darfur (Sudan), 
Kenya, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and 
Burundi.3  The only exception is Georgia, 
which became the situation under 
investigation only in 2016. This number 
can be said to be a reflection of the fact that 
there have been many armed conflicts in 
Africa in the last 15 years. But there are 
also armed conflicts taking place outside of 
Africa and the number of armed conflicts in 
Africa has not necessarily increased for the 
last 15 years. It is true that the ICC is 
investigating and as a result indicting the 
disproportionate number of Africans, 
which could give the impression that the 
ICC is targeting Africa while ignoring 
criminals outside of Africa. 
It goes without saying that one of the 
main reasons of this tendency is the high 
rate of participation in the Rome Statute of 
the African states. There are at this 
moment 123 States Parties to the Rome 
Statute after the withdrawal of Burundi. 
There are 33 African states among them. 
Even if there are high numbers of States 
                                                  
3 International Criminal Court website, 
‘’Situations under Investigation,’’ 
Parties from Europe and Canada (43 
states), Latin America (28 states), and the 
Pacific (13 states) where only a few number 
of armed conflicts have been recorded since 
2003. There are only a limited number of 
Asian states, Jordan, Afghanistan, 
Cambodia, Timor-Leste, South Korea and 
Japan. Only if more States Parties from the 
Middle East and South Asia had joined in 
the ICC, it would have been less 
concentration on African cases. The ICC’s 
extensive involvements in Africa is to a 
great extent a result of the participation in 
the ICC of such a large number of African 
states. Given that the states in other 
conflict-torn regions tend to avoid the ICC, 
the high participation rate of African 
states strongly shows that Africa was a 
great supporter of the ICC. 
As long as this observation applies, it 
does not make sense to blame the ICC for 
being biased. It would not make sense that 
African states misunderstood the ICC. 
When they need it, they joined; if they do 
not need it any more, they would withdraw 
from it. It would not be absurd to say that 
the ICC has been dealing with African 
cases in a disproportionate manner, even if 
it is not purely a result of its own discretion. 
The ICC handles Africa due to the 
structural circumstance of international 
politics including disproportionate 
participation rates among various regions. 
It is thus necessary to examine political 
<https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx>. 
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circumstances to understand the shifts of 
the positions of African states toward the 
ICC. 
 
 
2. The Impacts of Sudan and Kenya 
 
African states were not necessarily 
critical of the ICC from the beginning. Not 
all the cases on African states frustrated 
them. Rather, there are two particular 
outstanding cases in the history of the ICC 
are Sudan and Kenya, where the 
incumbent governments are under 
investigation due to formal or informal 
requests by outsiders of the ICC’s normal 
activities.  
Out of the formally expressed 
intensions to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute, Gambia took back its position 
after the regime change. Burundi, the only 
state which actually withdrew from the 
Rome Statute, is now the country under 
investigation and many believe that the 
government wanted to withdraw in order to 
avoid criminal investigation into 
themselves. The AU does not necessarily 
refer to Gambia and Burundi when it 
expresses critical views; it usually 
illustrates Sudan and Kenya as the ICC’s 
problematic involvements in African 
affairs. South Africa, significantly 
influential state in Africa, considers its 
withdrawal due to the controversy over its 
engagement with the case of Sudan. 
Sudan and Ethiopia, non-States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, are acute 
critics of the ICC in the AU. They represent 
the intersection between pro-ICC states 
and anti-ICC states may create tensions 
between themselves. When anti-ICC states 
are big regional powers in Africa, tensions 
entail grave political implications. Kenya 
and Uganda have expressed critical views 
on the ICC, although they are States-
Parties to the Rome Statute. They became 
critical because they have troubles with the 
ICC over their own cases respectively. But 
in the surrounding environment of their 
neighboring powers in East Africa more or 
less being critical of the ICC, they can also 
become critical rather easily. 
This situation makes a clear contrast 
with the pro-ICC bloc in West Africa. The 
regional power in East Africa, Nigeria, is a 
strong supporter of the ICC. The other 
states in West Africa are generally 
supportive of the ICC and critical of the 
anti-ICC states in the AU. The Southern 
African states are traditionally very 
supportive of the ICC, as in the case of 
Botswana still now. South Africa is an 
exception as a result of the incidental 
involvement in the case of Sudan. 
The list of the situations under the 
ICC’s investigation tells the reasons why 
there are regional gaps even within Africa. 
Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, DRC and CAR 
spread from East Africa to Central Africa. 
It should be noted that this list includes 
regional powers in East Africa and Central 
Africa. Libya in North Africa is an example 
｜ 35 ｜
  
 
  
in which the collapsed former regime is 
under investigation. The remaining 
countries, Mali and Cote d’Ivoire in West 
Africa, are the cases in which the ICC 
investigates the crimes of anti-government 
or former government groups. The ICC 
receives critical responses when it 
investigates governments, especially, of 
regional powers. It is natural to argue that 
political circumstances determine 
attitudes toward the ICC.  
It should be noted that Uganda, DRC, 
CAR, and Mali are the cases where 
investigations started in response to the 
requests by their own governments. They 
take modest attitudes toward the ICC. The 
only problematic case is Uganda, whose 
attitudes towards the ICC drifted 
significantly. The government sought to 
take back its request in vain in accordance 
with the progress of its peace negotiation 
with the rebel group, Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA) and then it began to criticize 
the ICC. 
In the history of the ICC, there are 
three cases in which investigations started 
proprio motu and two cases in which 
investigations started as a result of 
requests by the UN Security Council. It is 
significant to note that such controversial 
cases are all in Africa.  
 The investigation into Cote 
d’Ivoire started proprio motu. But the fact 
is that the AU requested the ICC to start 
                                                  
4 See, for instance, ICC website “Côte d'Ivoire”, 
the investigation in response to the ousting 
of former President Laurent Gbago. Over 
the turmoil at the time of the presidential 
election in 2010, both Gbago and Alassane 
Dramane Ouattara declared victory with 
the backing of the Constitutional Council 
and the Electoral Commission respectively. 
After the four months of confusion, Gbago 
was detained by Ouattara’s associates in 
April 2011. In half a year the ICC started 
the investigation and arrested Gbago for 
the crime against humanity in November 
2011. The AU was a catalyst in this 
development of events, while Cote d’Ivoire 
is not mentioned in the debate over the 
AU’s relationship with the ICC. 4 
The case of Kenya is more 
controversial, even though the 
circumstance is more or less similar from 
the perspective of the ICC. There occurred 
the violent incidents which killed around 
1,300 people due to the turmoil over the 
contested result of the presidential election 
in 2007-2008. Former UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, sought to bring about 
a political settlement. Annan demanded 
that the government should arrest those 
who were involved with the violence. 
Annan suggested that if it failed to do so, 
he would submit the list of the suspects to 
the ICC. As the government did not take 
actions to indict suspects, Annan actually 
submitted the list to the ICC. He made a 
de-facto request to the ICC for its 
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/cdi>. 
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indictment of the suspects as a result of the 
failure of his political mediation.5 
Luis Moreno Ocampo, First 
Prosecutor of the ICC, decided to indict 
Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first president 
of Kenya, John Kenyatta, and Finance 
Minister as well as Deputy Prime Minister, 
in 2012. Later, Kenyatta won the 
presidential election with another indicted 
man, William Ruto, as vice-president. After 
they assumed office in April 2013, they 
launched the campaign against the ICC. 
Fatou Bensouda, who had become the 
Prosecutor of the ICC in June 2012, decided 
to terminate the investigation into 
Kenyatta due to the lack of cooperation of 
the government of Kenya in 2014. She 
terminated the investigation into Ruto in 
2016. But until that time, the debate 
concerning sovereign immunity for heads 
of government had become a hot issue in 
Africa, which left a serious blow to the 
relationship between the ICC and African 
states.  
The two cases referred to the ICC by 
the UN Security Council are Libya and 
Sudan whose political implications differ. 
Libya is not widely discussed within the 
AU. It was originally a controversial issue. 
The destiny of the political leader in Libya 
                                                  
5  Makau W. Mutua, “Africans and the ICC: 
Hypocrisy, Impunity, and Perversion,” in 
Kamari M. Clarke, Abel S. Knottnerus and 
Eefje de Volder (eds.), Africa and the ICC: 
Perceptions of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), p. 53. 
6  As regards the financial scandal of former 
Prosecutor, Sven Becker, Marian Blasberg and 
Dietmar Pieper, “The Ocampo Affair: A Former 
marks a clear contrast between Libya and 
the cases of Sudan and Kenya. Only three 
months after the referral by the Security 
Council in March 2011, the ICC announced 
the indictment of the supreme political 
leader, Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar 
Gaddafi. But he was killed soon after the 
announcement and the ICC took back the 
indictment. The ICC could not have any 
presence over Libya and as a result did not 
have any criticisms.6 
By contrast, the Darfur case of Sudan 
is the most controversial case in the history 
of the ICC. With the intensification of the 
conflict in Darfur, the UN Security Council 
decided to refer the case to the ICC in 
March 2005. The George W. Bush 
administration of the USA did not exercise 
veto power despite its long-standing 
antagonistic attitude toward the ICC. The 
Indictment of President Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir was announced in March 
2009. The indictment against President Al 
Bashir was made also in July 2010. Since 
then he was not arrested although he 
travelled abroad frequently. The countries 
of his visits include some ICC States 
Parties like South Africa, which have not 
yet fulfilled their obligations.7  
Article 98 (1) of the Rome Statute of 
ICC Chief's Dubious Links’’, Spiegel Online, 5 
Oct., 2017 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/oca
mpo-affair-the-former-icc-chief-s-dubious-
libyan-ties-a-1171195.html>. 
7  Such ICC States Parties are Chad, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Uganda. 
President Al Bashir has often visited non-
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the ICC stipulates that “The Court may not 
proceed with a request for surrender which 
would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to 
which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that 
State to the Court, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of the sending 
State for the giving of consent for the 
surrender.” On the other hand, Article (2) 
stipulates that “Immunities or special 
procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person, whether under 
national or international law, shall not bar 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction 
over such a person.” There are some legal 
technicalities behind the scene that 
African states insist on sovereign 
immunity of heads of states, while the ICC 
does not admit it. 8 
The principle of sovereign immunity 
originates from the understanding of 
international law as a “horizontal” 
normative system. The traditional 
understanding of international law being a 
collection of treaties and customs of equal 
sovereign states concluded that equals 
would not be able to punish each other. 
There is room for legal discussions about 
how the Rome Statute as a multinational 
treaty can override the traditional 
                                                  
States Parties in Africa like Ethiopia and Egypt. 
8 Abel S. Knottnerus, “The AU, the ICC, and 
the Prosecution of African Presidents” in 
Clarke, Knottnerus and de Volder (eds.), Africa 
and the ICC. 
understanding of sovereign immunity 
procedurally. 
The manner of applying the principle 
of sovereign immunity has been changing 
due to the practices of international 
criminal courts since 1990s. The 
International Criminal Court for Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted the head of 
state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
President Slobodan Milošević, in 1999. He 
was transferred to The Hague and detained 
in 2001, after he lost power. The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indicted 
President of Liberia and head of state, 
Charles Taylor, in 2003. 9  After taking 
refuge in Nigeria, he was detained in 2006. 
He was found guilty in 2012. There are 
some such precedents of heads of state 
being indicted, arrested and sentenced.  
But the fact is that both Milošević and 
Taylor were arrested only after they were 
ousted from office. ICTY had the 
enforcement power of the UN Charter 
Chapter VII. The relationship between the 
UN Security Council and member countries 
is not necessarily equal as regards Chapter 
VII enforcement measures. The referral to 
the ICC over the Darfur Case was made by 
the UN Security Council. Thus, even if the 
ICC is based upon the multinational treaty, 
it is not impossible to assume that the 
referral by the UNSC may entail higher 
9 Hideaki Shinoda, “Peace-building by the Rule 
of Law: An Examination of Intervention in the 
Form of International Tribunals”, 
International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 
7, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 41-58. 
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authority. In such a manner, the 
controversy over sovereign immunity 
remains unresolved.  
When AU members discussed ICC 
related issues in October 2012, they argued 
that the ICC should admit participation in 
the court by President and Vice-president 
of Kenya through video-conference system 
from their home country. In addition, they 
requested the UN Security Council to take 
measures to postpone investigations into 
political leaders of Sudan and Kenya. At 
that time, Ethiopia’s prime minster, then 
chairperson of AU, Hailemariam Desalegn, 
pointed to the flaws of the ICC system and 
even its racism.10 
As a non-State Party to the Rome 
Statute, Sudan claims that it does not have 
to accept the jurisdiction of the ICC. Sudan 
argues that the ICC does not have the 
authority to indict non-State Party’s head 
of state. Sudan appeals to other African 
states so that they all protest against the 
ICC. As a result, other non-States Parties 
in the same region including Egypt and 
Ethiopia in particular became outspokenly 
hostile toward the ICC. They all influenced 
other countries especially in East Africa 
and the Great Lakes. When President Al 
Bashir visited South Africa for the AU 
summit meeting in 2015, the government of 
South Africa did not comply with the arrest 
                                                  
10  “African Union accuses ICC of 'hunting' 
Africans”, BBC News website, 27 May 2013 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
22681894>.  
11 Jean-baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “The African 
Union and the International Criminal Court: 
warrant by the ICC despite the request by 
the supreme court of South Africa. South 
Africa became an acute critic of the ICC 
after the incident, which led it to declare 
its intention to withdraw from the ICC.11 
The ambitious referral by the 
Security Council to the ICC stimulated 
tensions and frustrations among African 
states toward the ICC. It is ironic that the 
ICC being conscious of keeping apolitical 
standpoints as a legal court had to 
compromise its reputation as a result of the 
referral by the UNSC. The political nature 
of the ICC’s actions in such cases as Darfur 
makes blurred the boundary between law 
and politics. The ICC was not ready to cope 
with such a complex circumstance; it even 
lacked methodology to handle it. 
 
 
3. AU’s Withdrawal Strategy Document 
 
The Withdrawal Strategy Document 
issued by the AU on January 17, 2017 is an 
important document that explains how AU 
members are critical toward the ICC.12 It 
is not true that the Document simply 
advocated mass withdrawal from the ICC. 
Rather, it shows how AU members are 
frustrated. In the sense the Document is a 
guideline to identify possible manners to 
improve the relationship between African 
Counteracting the Crisis,” International Affairs, 
vol. 92, no. 6, 2016, pp. 1319–1342. 
12 https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/suppo
rting_resources/icc_withdrawal_strategy_jan._
2017.pdf#search=%27withdrawal+strategy+doc
ument+au%27 
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states and the ICC constructively.  
At first, the Withdrawal Strategy 
Document accuses the ICC of its double-
standard. But then it calls for reforms of 
the ICC by insisting on regionalization of 
international criminal law. It emphasizes 
the need for African solutions for African 
problems in the manner dignity of African 
states is maintained. 
To the great extent, the AU believes 
that empowerment of Africa is the solution. 
According to the AU, the ICC should not 
only rectify its attitude, but also increase 
the staff from Africa. The AU discusses the 
need for reforms of the Security Council by 
implying that the African presence ought to 
be increased in decision-making. The AU 
asks the question about the ICC’s potential 
contributions to enhancing capacities of 
domestic judicial activities in African 
states.  
The Withdrawal Strategy Document 
states: “In order to limit the intervention of 
the ICC, there is need to strengthen the 
legal regulatory frameworks and judicial 
mechanisms in AU member states to try 
international crimes. These may include 
developing continental, regional and 
national strategy such as model national 
laws, capacity building programmes (i.e. 
trainings, experience exchange 
programmes, etc.).” 13 
The Withdrawal Strategy Document 
indicates that the AU does not simply 
                                                  
13 Ibid., p. 12. 
pursue mass withdrawal. The AU asked for 
various levels of reforms inside and outside 
of the ICC. It even demands more attention 
from the ICC in the area of capacity 
building programmes for African states. 
The AU pursues regionalism, 
empowerment and partnership as regards 
the development of its relationship with 
the ICC. 
It should be noted that this attitude 
of the ICC highlights the nature of its 
withdrawal strategy. As shown in the 
previous section, the triggers of the debate 
about the withdrawal were the cases of 
Kenya and Sudan where the ICC was used 
as a tool for intervention to mediate 
political conflicts. To some extent African 
states have been responding such a 
political use of the ICC by influential 
external figures. The inevitability of 
politics, even if the ICC is a legal entity, 
complicates its activities and relationships 
with external actors. In a way the debate 
about the withdrawal arose out of such 
inevitability of politics in the activities of 
the ICC. 
This indicates the complexity of 
politics hidden behind the legalism of the 
ICC. When political intervention is 
pursued for the sake of peace, the ICC’s 
legalism could be regarded as a tool for 
peace. But those who insist on more 
contradictory nature of politics and law 
would feel that the need for peace should 
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be prioritized over legalism in the sense 
that African political leaders should be 
immune from indictments and arrests. 14  
It is fair to say that prioritization of 
political leaders is not the way for peace for 
ordinary people in Africa. Still, it would 
also be true that the ICC’s legalism does 
not really guarantee peaceful settlements 
of any conflicts in Africa. 15  
It is noteworthy that these dilemmas 
between politics and law and between 
peace and justice are highly connected to 
the antithesis between regionalism and 
universalism. The ICC’s complex nature of 
universalism through a multidimensional 
treaty tends to involve dynamism between 
regionalism and universalism. The 
voluntary nature of the framework of the 
Rome Statute creates room for regionalist 
approaches toward international criminal 
law, while the universalistic status of the 
ICC as exemplified by its relationship with 
the UN Security Council does not 
accommodate such regionalism. The AU 
does not attempt withdrawing from the 
regime of international criminal law. It is 
                                                  
14 See, for instance, Mark Kersten, Justice in 
Conflict: The Effects of the International 
Criminal Court’s Interventions on Ending Wars 
and Building Peace (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
15 See Solomon Ayele Dersso, “With its Focus 
on Insulating African Leaders from Prosecution, 
the AU Summit missed an Opportunity to fix 
some of the Flaws in the ICC System,” ISS 
Today, 15 Oct 2013 <https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/the-aus-icc-summit-a-case-of-elite-
solidarity-for-self-preservation>. 
16 The African Court on Human and People’s 
Rights <http://www.african-court.org/en/> was 
supposed to be merged with the Court of Justice 
of the African Union. See the “Protocol on the 
crying for multi-layer implementations of 
international criminal law at the levels of 
states, regions and the entire international 
community. The African Court on Human 
and Peoples' Rights should be regarded as 
part of such overall attempts. 16 This does 
not mean that the regional court is a simple 
substitute for the ICC; rather it represents 
a vision of more multi-layered 
international system. African regionalism 
is now based on the principles of local 
ownership, empowerment and 
partnerships.   
The issue of capacity building can be 
understood as an agenda of “positive 
complementarity” even from the 
perspective of the Rome Statute. According 
to the original understanding of 
complementarity, the ICC’s judicial 
intervention is justified when national 
legal systems are not capable enough to 
prosecute criminals. But if so, the principle 
of complementarity should also mean that 
the ICC promotes enhancement of 
capacities of local judicial systems. In fact, 
some of the countries under the ICC’s 
Statute of the African Court.’’ 
<http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/images/d
ocs/legal-texts/acjhr_protocol.pdf>. See, for 
instance, Manisuli Ssenyonjo, “The African 
Court of Justice and Human and People’s 
Rights ‘International Criminal Law Section’: 
Promoting Impunity for African Union Heads of 
State and Senior State Officials?” International 
Criminal Law Review, vol. 16, 2016, pp. 71-102; 
Jean-Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo, “Victims at 
the Prospective International Criminal Law 
Section of the African Court of Justice and 
Human and People’s Rights,” International 
Criminal Law Review, vol. 17, 2017, pp. 453-
485. 
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investigation are the target areas of 
capacity building programs provided 
through development aid agencies and UN 
peace operations. The sense of normative 
orientation towards “positive 
complementary” exists within the 
international policy community.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has sought to analyse the 
circumstance behind the debate about the 
withdrawal from the ICC by African states. 
The essay has suggested that some 
particularly political cases created by 
external interventions have accelerated 
critical views on the ICC among African 
states. Thus, the debate should not simply 
be regarded as a phenomenon of mass 
withdrawal. There are structural issues of 
the relationships between politics and law, 
between peace and justice, and between 
regionalism and universalism. The AU is 
seeking to address these issues as 
inevitable concerns for those working for 
the ICC.  
This does not mean that the AU 
confronts the ICC for the sake of politics, 
peace and regionalism against law, justice 
and universalism. Rather, the debate 
illustrates the fact that the ICC must 
survive in such complex reality instead of 
avoiding it. This could be regarded as an 
observation of the current state of the 
world where many political complexities 
exist as challenges to liberal international 
order in the process of implementation of 
international criminal law. 
This essay thus has suggested that 
the ICC should face such complexities of 
reality and expectations from African 
states. Without compromising its legal 
nature, the ICC should be able to pursue 
various practical activities in the name of 
“positive complementarity”. The ICC 
should be able to handle the dilemmas 
between politics and law, peace and justice, 
and regionalism and universalism. Even if 
it would have to do so very carefully, it does 
not have any other options than living in 
such a complex world. 
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